draft-rpki-has-no-identity/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml
2021-03-14 15:26:06 -07:00

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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd">
<?rfc comments="yes"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<?rfc inline="yes"?>
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="6"?>
<?rfc tocindent="yes"?>
<?rfc tocompact="yes"?>
<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity-00" ipr="trust200902">
<front>
<title>The I in RPKI does not stand for Identity</title>
<author fullname="Randy Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush">
<organization>Arrcus &amp; Internet Initiative Japan</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>5147 Crystal Springs</street>
<city>Bainbridge Island</city>
<region>WA</region>
<code>98110</code>
<country>US</country>
</postal>
<email>randy@psg.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<date />
<abstract>
<t>There is a false notion that internet number resource in the RPKI
can be associated with the real world identity of the 'owner' of an
internet number resource. This document attempts to put that notion
to rest.</t>
</abstract>
<note title="Requirements Language">
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when,
and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
</note>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
<t>The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), see <xref
target="RFC6480"/>, "represents the allocation hierarchy of IP
address space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers."</t>
<t>In security terms the phrase "Public Key" implies there are also
private keys, a la <xref target="RFC2459"/>. And, as the RPKI has
strong authority over ownership of Internet Number Resources (INRs),
there is a desire to use the private keys to sign arbitrary
documents to attest that the 'owner' of those resources has attested
to the authenticity of those documents.</t>
<t>The desire is to authenticate real world business transactions
with the signatures of INR holders. E.g. for Bill's Bait and Sushi
to use their AS in the RPKI to sign a Letter of Authorization (LOA)
for some other party to rack and stack hardware owned by BB&amp;S.
Unfortunately, this is not feasible.</t>
<t>The I in RPKI actually stands for "Infrastructure," as in
Resource Public Key Infrastructure, not for "Identity". In fact,
the RPKI does not provide any association between INRs and the real
world holder(s) of those INRs.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="bottom" title="The Bottom Line">
<t>The Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the
Resource PKI (RPKI) <xref target="RFC7382"/> Section 3.1, Naming,
makes very clear that "The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD
NOT be meaningful;" and goes on to do so at some length.</t>
<t>That the RPKI does not authenticate real world identity is a
feature not a bug. If it tried to do so, it would end in a world of
complexity with no proof of termination, as X.400 learned.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="discuss" title="Discussion">
<t>Normally, the INR holder does not hold the private key attesting
to their resources; the Certification Authority (CA) does.</t>
<t>As the INR owner does not have the keying material, they rely on
the CA, to which they presumably must present credentials, to
manipulate their INRs. These credentials may be userid/password
(with two factor authentication one hopes), a hardware token, client
browser certificates, etc.</t>
<t>Hence schemes such as <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta"/>
and <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc"/> must go to great
lengths to extract the supposedly [not really] relevant keys from
the CA.</t>
<t>For some particular INR, say Bill's Bait and Sushi's AS number,
someone out on the net probably has the credentials to the CA
account in which it is registered. That could be the owner of
BB&amp;S, Roberto's Taco Stand, or the Government of Elbonia. One
simply can not know.</t>
<t>Then there is the temporal issue. The owner of that AS may be
BB&amp;S today when some document was signed, and could be the
Government of Elbonia tomorrow. Or the resource could have been
administratively moved from one CA to another, likely requiring a
change of kets. If so, is the signature still valid?</t>
<t>Beware that, while Ghostbuster Records <xref target="RFC6493"/>
may seem to identify a real world entity, in fact their semantic
content is completely arbitrary, and does not attest to INR
ownership. They are merely a clue for operational support contact
in case of technical RPKI problems.</t>
<t>It is somewhat droll that the CPS template, <xref
target="RFC7382"/>, does not mention any diligence the CA MUST, or
even SHOULD, conduct to assure the INRs are in fact owned by a
registrant.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>Attempts to use RPKI data to authenticate real world documents or
other artifacts requiring identity are invalid and misleading.</t>
</section>
<section anchor="iana" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>This document has no IANA Considerations.</t>
<!--
<t>Note to RFC Editor: this section may be replaced on publication
as an RFC.</t>
-->
</section>
<section anchor="acks" title="Acknowledgments">
<t>The authors thank George Michaelson and Job Snijders for lively
discussion.</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2459"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6480"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.7382"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8174"?>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6493"?>
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc"?>
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta"?>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>