diff --git a/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml b/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml
index 91648fc..43a5cf0 100644
--- a/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml
+++ b/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
In security terms the phrase "Public Key" implies there are also
private keys, a la . And, as the RPKI has
strong authority over ownership of Internet Number Resources (INRs),
- there is a desire to use the private keys to sign arbitraty
+ there is a desire to use the private keys to sign arbitrary
documents to attest that the 'owner' of those resources has attested
to the authenticity of those documents.
@@ -97,46 +97,49 @@
- In reality, the INR holder does not even hold the private key
- attesting to their resources; the Certification Authority (CA) does.
- Which is why schemes such as and must go to great lengths to
- extract the supposedly [not really] relevant keys from the CA.
+ Normally, the INR holder does not hold the private key attesting
+ to their resources; the Certification Authority (CA) does.
As the INR owner does not have the keying material, they rely on
- the CA, to which they presumably must present credentials to
+ the CA, to which they presumably must present credentials, to
manipulate their INRs. These credentials may be userid/password
- (with two factor authentication one hopes), client browser
- certificates, etc.
+ (with two factor authentication one hopes), a hardware token, client
+ browser certificates, etc.
+
+ Hence schemes such as
+ and must go to great
+ lengths to extract the supposedly [not really] relevant keys from
+ the CA.
For some particular INR, say Bill's Bait and Sushi's AS number,
- someone out on the net probably has the credentials to the CA where
- it is registered. That could be the owner of BB&S, Roberto's
- Taco Stand, or the Government of Elbonia. One simpley can not
- know.
+ someone out on the net probably has the credentials to the CA
+ account in which it is registered. That could be the owner of
+ BB&S, Roberto's Taco Stand, or the Government of Elbonia. One
+ simply can not know.
Then there is the temporal issue. The owner of that AS may be
- BB&S today when your document was signed, and could be the
- Government of Elbonia tomorrow. If so, is the signature still
- valid?
+ BB&S today when some document was signed, and could be the
+ Government of Elbonia tomorrow. Or the resource could have been
+ administratively moved from one CA to another, likely requiring a
+ change of kets. If so, is the signature still valid?
+
+ Beware that, while Ghostbuster Records
+ may seem to identify a real world entity, in fact their semantic
+ content is completely arbitrary, and does not attest to INR
+ ownership. They are merely a clue for operational support contact
+ in case of technical RPKI problems.
It is somewhat droll that the CPS template, , does not mention any diligence the CA MUST, or
even SHOULD, conduct to assure the INRs are in fact owned by a
registrant.
- While Ghostbuster Records may seem to
- identify a real world entity, in fact their content is completely
- arbitrary, and do not attest to INR ownership. They are merely an
- clue for operational support in case of problems.
-
Attempts to use RPKI data to authenticate real world documents or
- other artifacts requiring indentiy are invalid and misleading.
+ other artifacts requiring identity are invalid and misleading.