diff --git a/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml b/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml index 91648fc..43a5cf0 100644 --- a/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml +++ b/draft-ymbk-rpki-has-no-identity.xml @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ In security terms the phrase "Public Key" implies there are also private keys, a la . And, as the RPKI has strong authority over ownership of Internet Number Resources (INRs), - there is a desire to use the private keys to sign arbitraty + there is a desire to use the private keys to sign arbitrary documents to attest that the 'owner' of those resources has attested to the authenticity of those documents. @@ -97,46 +97,49 @@
- In reality, the INR holder does not even hold the private key - attesting to their resources; the Certification Authority (CA) does. - Which is why schemes such as and must go to great lengths to - extract the supposedly [not really] relevant keys from the CA. + Normally, the INR holder does not hold the private key attesting + to their resources; the Certification Authority (CA) does. As the INR owner does not have the keying material, they rely on - the CA, to which they presumably must present credentials to + the CA, to which they presumably must present credentials, to manipulate their INRs. These credentials may be userid/password - (with two factor authentication one hopes), client browser - certificates, etc. + (with two factor authentication one hopes), a hardware token, client + browser certificates, etc. + + Hence schemes such as + and must go to great + lengths to extract the supposedly [not really] relevant keys from + the CA. For some particular INR, say Bill's Bait and Sushi's AS number, - someone out on the net probably has the credentials to the CA where - it is registered. That could be the owner of BB&S, Roberto's - Taco Stand, or the Government of Elbonia. One simpley can not - know. + someone out on the net probably has the credentials to the CA + account in which it is registered. That could be the owner of + BB&S, Roberto's Taco Stand, or the Government of Elbonia. One + simply can not know. Then there is the temporal issue. The owner of that AS may be - BB&S today when your document was signed, and could be the - Government of Elbonia tomorrow. If so, is the signature still - valid? + BB&S today when some document was signed, and could be the + Government of Elbonia tomorrow. Or the resource could have been + administratively moved from one CA to another, likely requiring a + change of kets. If so, is the signature still valid? + + Beware that, while Ghostbuster Records + may seem to identify a real world entity, in fact their semantic + content is completely arbitrary, and does not attest to INR + ownership. They are merely a clue for operational support contact + in case of technical RPKI problems. It is somewhat droll that the CPS template, , does not mention any diligence the CA MUST, or even SHOULD, conduct to assure the INRs are in fact owned by a registrant. - While Ghostbuster Records may seem to - identify a real world entity, in fact their content is completely - arbitrary, and do not attest to INR ownership. They are merely an - clue for operational support in case of problems. -
Attempts to use RPKI data to authenticate real world documents or - other artifacts requiring indentiy are invalid and misleading. + other artifacts requiring identity are invalid and misleading.