draft-rov-no-rr/draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr.xml
2022-06-02 11:08:19 -07:00

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XML

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"?>
<!-- <!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd"> -->
<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
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<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
<?rfc toc="yes"?>
<?rfc tocdepth="3"?>
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<rfc category="std" consensus="true"
submissionType="IETF"
docName="draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-02"
ipr="trust200902" updates="8481">
<front>
<title abbrev="RPKI-Based Policy Without Route Refresh">
RPKI-Based Policy Without Route Refresh
</title>
<author fullname="Randy Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush">
<organization>IIJ Research Lab &amp; Arrcus, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>1856 SW Edgewood Dr</street>
<city>Portland</city>
<region>Oregon</region>
<code>97210</code>
<country>United States of America</country>
</postal>
<email>randy@psg.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Keyur Patel" initials="K." surname="Patel">
<organization>Arrcus, Inc.</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400</street>
<city>San Jose</city>
<region>CA</region>
<code>95119</code>
<country>United States of America</country>
</postal>
<email>keyur@arrcus.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Philip Smith" initials="P." surname="Smith">
<organization>PFS Internet Development Pty Ltd</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>PO Box 1908</street>
<city>Milton</city>
<region>QLD</region>
<code>4064</code>
<country>Australia</country>
</postal>
<email>pfsinoz@gmail.com</email>
</address>
</author>
<author fullname="Mark Tinka" initials="M." surname="Tinka">
<organization>SEACOM</organization>
<address>
<postal>
<street>Building 7, Design Quarter District, Leslie Avenue, Magaliessig</street>
<city>Fourways, Gauteng</city>
<code>2196</code>
<country>South Africa</country>
</postal>
<email>mark@tinka.africa</email>
</address>
</author>
<date />
<abstract>
<t>
A BGP Speaker performing RPKI-based policy should not issue Route
Refresh to its neighbors when receiving new RPKI data. A method
for avoiding doing so is described.
</t>
</abstract>
<note title="Requirements Language">
<t>
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref
target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
</t>
</note>
</front>
<middle>
<section anchor="intro" title="Introduction">
<t>
Memory constraints in early BGP speakers caused classic <xref
target="RFC4271"/> BGP implementations to not keep a full
Adj-RIB-In (Sec. 1.1). When doing RPKI-based Route Origin
Validation (<xref target="RFC6811"/> and <xref
target="RFC8481"/>), and similar RPKI-based policy, if such a BGP
speaker receives new RPKI data, it might not have kept paths
previously marked as Invalid etc. Such an implementation must
then request a Route Refresh <xref target="RFC7313"/> from its
neighbors to recover the paths which might be covered by these new
RPKI data. This will be perceived as rude by those neighbors as
it passes a serious resource burden on to them. This document
recommends implementations keep and mark paths affected by
RPKI-based policy so Route Refresh is no longer needed.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="related" title="Related Work">
<t>
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, <xref
target="RFC4271"/> and Route Refresh <xref target="RFC7313"/>, the
RPKI <xref target="RFC6480"/>, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs),
<xref target="RFC6482"/>, The Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) to Router Protocol <xref
target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis"/>, RPKI-based Prefix Validation,
<xref target="RFC6811"/>, and Origin Validation Clarifications,
<xref target="RFC8481"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="experience" title="ROV Experience">
<t>
As Route Origin Validation dropping Invalids has deployed, some
BGP speaker implementations have been found which, when receiving new
RPKI data (VRPs, see <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis"/>)
issue a BGP Route Refresh <xref target="RFC7313"/> to all sending
BGP peers so that it can reevaluate the received paths aginst the
new data.
</t>
<t>
In actual deployment this has been found to be very destructive,
transferring a serious resource burden to the unsuspecting peers.
In reaction, RPKI based Route Origin Validation (ROV) has been
turned off; and there have been actual de-peerings.
</t>
<t>
As RPKI registration and ROA creation have steadily increased,
this problem has increased, not just proportionally, but on the
order of the in-degree of ROV implementing BGP speakers. As ASPA
(<xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification"/>) becomes
used, the problem will increase.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="rib" title="Keeping Partial Adj-RIB-In Data">
<t>
Ameliorating this problem by keeping a full Adj-RIB-In can be a
problem for resource constrained BGP speakers. In reality, only some
data need be retained.
</t>
<t>
When RPKI data cause one or more paths to be dropped due to ROV,
those paths MUST NOT be evaluated for best path, but MUST be saved
(either separately or marked) so they may be reevaluated with
respect to new RPKI data.
</t>
<t>
If new RPKI data arrive which invalidate the best path, and the
BGP speaker did not keep all alternatives, then it MUST issue a
route refresh so those alternatives may be evaluated for best
path.
</t>
<t>
Policy which may drop paths due to RPKI-based checks such as ROV,
ASPA, BGPsec <xref target="RFC8205"/>, etc. MUST be run, and the
dropped paths saved per the above paragraph, before non-RPKI
policies are run, as the latter may change path attributes.
</t>
<t>
As storing these paths could cause problems in resource
constrained devices, there MUST be a knob allowing operator
control of this feature. Such a knob MUST NOT be per peer, as
this could cause inconsistent behavior.
</t>
<t>
If Route Refresh has been issued toward more than one peer, the
order of receipt of the refresh data can cause churn in both best
path selection and in outbound signaling.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="ops" title="Operational Recommendations">
<t>
Operators deploying ROV and/or other RPKI based policies SHOULD
ensure that the BGP speaker implementation is not causing
unnecessary Route Refresh requests to neighbors.
</t>
<t>
BGP Speakers MUST either keep the full Adj-RIB-In or implement the
specification in <xref target="rib"/>.
</t>
<t>
If the BGP speaker does not implement these recommendations, the
operator SHOULD enable the vendor's knob to keep the full
Adj-RIB-In, sometimes referred to as "soft reconfiguration
inbound". The operator should then measure to ensure that there
are no unnecessary Route Refresh requests sent to neighbors.
</t>
<t>
If the BGP speaker has insufficient resources to support either of
the two proposed options, it MUST not be used for Route Origin
Validation. I.e. the knob in <xref target="rib"/> should only be
used in very well known and controlled circumstances.
</t>
<t>
Operators using the specification in <xref target="rib"/> should
be aware that a misconfigured neighbor might erroneously send a
massive number of paths, thus consuming a lot of memory.
Pre-policy filtering such as described in <xref
target="I-D.sas-idr-maxprefix-inbound"/> SHOULD be used to reduce
this exposure.
</t>
<t>
Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)which provide <xref
target="RFC7947"/> Route Servers should be aware that some members
could be causing an undue Route Refresh load on the Route Servers
and take appropriate administrative and/or technical measures.
IXPs using BGP speakers as route servers should ensure that they
are not generating excessive route refresh requests.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>
This document describes a denial of service which Route Origin
Validation or other RPKI policy may place on a BGP neighbor, and
describes how it may be ameliorated.
</t>
<t>
Otherwise, this document adds no additional security considerations
to those already described by the referenced documents.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="IANA" title="IANA Considerations">
<t>
None
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="acks" title="Acknowledgements">
<t>
The authors wish to thank Ben Maddison, Derek Yeung,, John
Heasley, John Scudder, Matthias Waehlisch, Nick Hilliard, Saku
Ytti, and Ties de Kock.
</t>
</section>
</middle>
<back>
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.4271.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.7313.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8174.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.sas-idr-maxprefix-inbound.xml"?>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6480.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6482.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6811.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.7947.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8205.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8481.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification.xml"?>
</references>
</back>
</rfc>