a lot of new text to respond to hilliard and maddison

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Randy Bush 2021-11-13 21:14:15 -08:00
parent 3d02593371
commit f6b743e810

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@ -10,7 +10,9 @@
<?rfc compact="yes"?>
<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
<rfc category="info" docName="draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr-01" ipr="trust200902">
<rfc category="std" consensus="true"
docName="draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr-02"
ipr="trust200902" updates="8481">
<front>
@ -119,47 +121,106 @@
Invalidated paths so the Route Refresh is no longer needed.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="related" title="Related Work">
<t>
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, <xref
target="RFC4271"/> and Route Refresh <xref target="RFC7313"/>, the
RPKI <xref target="RFC6480"/>, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs),
<xref target="RFC6482"/>, The Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) to Router Protocol <xref
target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis"/>, RPKI-based Prefix Validation,
<xref target="RFC6811"/>, and Origin Validation Clarifications,
<xref target="RFC8481"/>.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="related" title="Related Work">
<section anchor="experience" title="ROV Experience">
<t>
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, <xref
target="RFC4271"/> and Route Refresh <xref target="RFC7313"/>, the
RPKI <xref target="RFC6480"/>, Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs),
<xref target="RFC6482"/>, The Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) to Router Protocol <xref
target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis"/>, RPKI-based Prefix Validation,
<xref target="RFC6811"/>, and Origin Validation Clarifications,
<xref target="RFC8481"/>.
</t>
<t>
As Route Origin Validation dropping Invalids has depoyed, some
router implementations have been found which, when receiving new
RPKI data (VRPs, see <xref target="I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis"/>)
issue a BGP Route Refresh <xref target="RFC7313"/> to all sending
BGP peers so that it can reevaluate the received paths aginst the
new data.
</t>
</section>
<t>
In actual deployment this has been found to be very destructive,
transferring a serious resource burden to the unsuspecting peers.
In reaction, RPKI based Route Origin Validation (ROV) has been
turned off; and there have been actual de-peerings.
</t>
<t>
As RPKI registration and ROA creation have steadily increased,
this problem has increased, not just proportionally, but on the
order of the in-degree of ROV implementing routers.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="rib" title="Keeping Partial Adj-RIB-In Data">
<t>
Ameliorating this problem by keeping a full Adj-RIB-In can be a
problem for resource constrained routers. In reality, only some
data need be retained.
</t>
<t>
When RPKI data cause one or more paths to be dropped, withdrawn,
or merely not chosn as best path due to RPKI-based policy (ROV,
ASPA, etc.), those paths MUST be saved and marked so that later
VRPs can reevaluate them against then current policy.
</t>
<t>
As storing these paths could cause problems in resource
constrained devices, there MUST be a knob allowing operator
control of this feature. Such a knob MUST NOT be per peer, as
this could cause inconsistent behavior.
</t>
</section>
<section anchor="ops" title="Operational Recommendations">
<t>
Routers MUST either keep the full Adj-RIB-In or implement this
specification.
Routers MUST either keep the full Adj-RIB-In or implement the
specification in <xref target="rib"/>.
</t>
<t>
Operators deploying ROV SHOULD ensure that the router
implementation is not causing unnecessary Route Refresh requests
to neighbors.
Operators deploying ROV and/or other RPKI based policies SHOULD
ensure that the router implementation is not causing unnecessary
Route Refresh requests to neighbors.
</t>
<t>
If the router does not implement the recommendations here, the
If the router does not implement these recommendations, the
operator SHOULD enable the vendor's knob to keep the full
Adj-RIB-In, sometimes referred to as "soft reconfiguration
inbound". The operator should then ensure that this stops
unnecessary Route Refresh requests to neighbors.
inbound". The operator should then measure to ensure that there
are no unnecessary Route Refresh requests sent to neighbors.
</t>
<t>
If the router has insufficient resources to support this, it
MUST not be used for Route Origin Validation.
MUST not be used for Route Origin Validation. I.e. the knob in
<xref target="rib"/> should only be used in very well known and
controlled circumstances.
</t>
<t>
Internet Exchange Points which provide <xref target="RFC7947"/>
Route Servers should be aware that some members could be causing
an undue Route Refresh load on the Route Servers and take
appropriate administrative and/or technical measures.
</t>
</section>
@ -167,9 +228,9 @@
<section anchor="Security" title="Security Considerations">
<t>
This document describes a denial of service Route Origin
Validation may place on a BGP neighbor, and describes how it may
be ameliorated.
This document describes a denial of service which Route Origin
Validation or other RPKI policy may place on a BGP neighbor, and
describes how it may be ameliorated.
</t>
<t>
@ -194,27 +255,26 @@
<references title="Normative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.4271.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6482.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6811.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.7313.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8174.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8481.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis.xml"?>
</references>
<references title="Informative References">
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6480.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6482.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6811.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.7947.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8481.xml"?>
<?rfc include="reference.I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis.xml"?>
</references>
<!--
<section anchor="Acknowledgements" title="Acknowledgements">
<t>
The authors wish to thank Philip Smith and Mark Tinka.
The authors wish to thank Ben Maddison and Nick Hilliard.
</t>
</section>
-->
</back>