From 25f9a774766f8bfd5d9f5bb9b44ad518f9142534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Bush Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 12:23:26 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] first cut --- draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr.xml | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 174 insertions(+) create mode 100644 draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr.xml diff --git a/draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr.xml b/draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr.xml new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d00b30 --- /dev/null +++ b/draft-ymbk-sidrops-rov-no-rr.xml @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + RPKI Route Origin Validation Without Route Refresh + + + + Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc. +
+ + 1856 SW Edgewood Dr + Portland + Oregon + 97210 + United States of America + + randy@psg.com +
+ + + + Arrcus +
+ + 2077 Gateway Place, Suite #400 + San Jose + CA + 95119 + United States of America + + keyur@arrcus.com +
+ + + + + + + + A BGP Speaker performing RPKI-based Route Origin Validation should + not issue Route Refresh to its neighbors when receiving new VRPs. + + + + + + + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL + NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", + "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as + described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all + capitals, as shown here. + + + + + + + + +
+ + + Memory constraints in early routers caused classic BGP implementations to not keep a full + Adj-RIB-In (Sec. 1.1). When doing RPKI-based Route Origin + Validation ( and ), if such a BGP speaker receives new ROAs/VRPs, + it might not have kept paths previously marked as Invalid. Such + an implementation must then request a Route Refresh from its neighbors to recover the paths which + might be covered by these new VRPs. This will be perceived as + rude by those neighbors as it passes a serious resource burden on + to them. This document suggests marking but keeping Invalidated + paths so the Route Refresh is no longer needed. + + +
+ +
+ + It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, and Route Refresh , the + RPKI , Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), + , The Resource Public Key Infrastructure + (RPKI) to Router Protocol , + RPKI-based Prefix Validation, , and Origin + Validation Clarifications, . + +
+ +
+ + + Operators deploying ROV SHOULD ensure that the router implemention + is not causing unnecessary Route Refresh requests to neighbors. + + + + If the router does not implement the recommendations here, the + operator SHOULD enable "soft reconfiguration inbound," and check + that this stops unnecessary Route Refresh requests to neighbors. + + + + If the router has insufficient resources to support this, it + SHOULD not be used for Route Origin Validation. + + +
+ +
+ + + This document adds no additional security considerations to those + already described by the referenced documents. + + +
+ +
+ + + None + + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ + + The authors wish to thank Philip Smith and Mark Tinka. + + +
+ + + +