974 lines
36 KiB
XML
974 lines
36 KiB
XML
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"?>
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<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd">
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<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
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<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
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<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
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<?rfc toc="yes"?>
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<?rfc tocdepth="3"?>
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<?rfc compact="yes"?>
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<?rfc subcompact="no"?>
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<rfc category="std" docName="draft-ymbk-sidrops-6486bis-00" updates="6486" ipr="trust200902">
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<front>
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<title abbrev="RPKI Manifests">Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
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<author initials="R." surname="Austein" fullname="Rob Austein">
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<organization>Arrcus, Inc.</organization>
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<address>
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<email>sra@hactrn.net</email>
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</address>
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</author>
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<author fullname="Geoff Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston">
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<organization>APNIC</organization>
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<address>
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<postal>
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<street>6 Cordelia St</street>
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<city>South Brisbane</city>
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<code>QLD 4101</code>
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<country>Australia</country>
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</postal>
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<email>gih@apnic.net</email>
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</address>
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</author>
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<author fullname="Stephen Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent">
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<organization >Independent</organization>
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<address>
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<email>kkent@alum.mit.edu</email>
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</address>
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</author>
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<author fullname="Matt Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski">
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<organization>New College Florida</organization>
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<address>
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<postal>
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<street>5800 Bay Shore Rd.</street>
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<city>Sarasota, FL</city>
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<code>34243</code>
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<country>USA</country>
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</postal>
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<email>mlepinski@ncf.edu</email>
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</address>
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</author>
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<date />
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<abstract>
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<t>
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This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public
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Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A manifest is a signed object (file)
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that contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the
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repository publication point (directory) associated with an
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authority responsible for publishing in the repository. For each
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certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of
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signed objects issued by the authority that are published at this
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repository publication point, the manifest contains both the name
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of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content.
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Manifests are intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect
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certain forms of attacks against a repository. Specifically, if
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an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects
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retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can
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detect "stale" (valid) data and deletion of signed objects.
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</t>
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</abstract>
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</front>
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<middle>
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<section title="Introduction" anchor="sect-1">
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<t>
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The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) <xref
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target="RFC6480"/> makes use of a distributed repository system
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<xref target="RFC6481"/> to make available a variety of objects
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needed by relying parties (RPs). Because all of the objects
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stored in the repository system are digitally signed by the
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entities that created them, attacks that modify these published
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objects are detectable by RPs. However, digital signatures
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provide no protection against attacks that substitute "stale"
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versions of signed objects (i.e., objects that were valid and have
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not expired, but have since been superseded) or attacks that
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remove an object that should be present in the repository. To
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assist in the detection of such attacks, the RPKI repository
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system can make use of a signed object called a "manifest".
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</t>
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<t>
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A manifest is a signed object that enumerates all the signed
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objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory)
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that are associated with an authority responsible for publishing
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at that publication point. Each manifest contains both the name
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of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content,
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for every signed object issued by an authority that is published
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at the authority's repository publication point. A manifest is
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intended to allow an RP to detect unauthorized object removal or
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the substitution of stale versions of objects at a publication
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point. A manifest also is intended to allow an RP to detect
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similar outcomes that may result from a man-in-the-middle attack
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on the retrieval of objects from the repository. Manifests are
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intended to be used in Certification Authority (CA) publication
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points in repositories (directories containing files that are
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subordinate certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
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issued by this CA and other signed objects that are verified by
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end-entity (EE) certificates issued by this CA).
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</t>
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<t>
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Manifests are modeled on CRLs, as the issues involved in detecting
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stale manifests and potential attacks using manifest replays,
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etc., are similar to those for CRLs. The syntax of the manifest
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payload differs from CRLs, since RPKI repositories contain objects
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not covered by CRLs, e.g., digitally signed objects, such as Route
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Origination Authorizations (ROAs).
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</t>
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<section title="Requirements Language">
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<t>
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
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NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
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"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
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described in BCP 14 <xref format="default" pageno="false"
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target="RFC2119"/> <xref format="default" pageno="false"
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target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all
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capitals, as shown here.
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</t>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section title="Manifest Scope" anchor="sect-2">
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<t>
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A manifest associated with a CA's repository publication point
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contains a list of:
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</t>
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<t>
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<list style="symbols">
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<t>
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the set of (non-expired, non-revoked) certificates issued and
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published by this CA,
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</t>
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<t>
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the most recent CRL issued by this CA, and
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</t>
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<t>
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all published signed objects that are verifiable using EE
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certificates <xref target="RFC6487"/> issued by this CA.
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</t>
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</list>
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</t>
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<t>
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Every RPKI signed object includes, in the Cryptographic Message
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Syntax (CMS) <xref target="RFC3370"/> wrapper of the object, the
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EE certificate used to verify it <xref target="RFC6488"/>. Thus,
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there is no requirement to separately publish that EE certificate
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at the CA's repository publication point.
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</t>
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<t>
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Where multiple CA instances share a common publication point, as
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can occur when an entity performs a key-rollover operation <xref
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target="RFC6489"/>, the repository publication point will contain
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multiple manifests. In this case, each manifest describes only
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the collection of published products of its associated CA
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instance.
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</t>
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</section>
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<section title="Manifest Signing" anchor="sect-3">
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<t>
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A CA's manifest is verified using an EE certificate. The
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SubjectInfoAccess (SIA) field of this EE certificate contains the
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access method OID of id-ad-signedObject.
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</t>
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<t>
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The CA MAY choose to sign only one manifest with each generated
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private key, and generate a new key pair for each new version of
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the manifest. This form of use of the associated EE certificate
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is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate.
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</t>
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<t>
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Alternatively, the CA MAY elect to use the same private key to
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sign a sequence of manifests. Because only a single manifest
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(issued under a single CA instance) is current at any point in
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time, the associated EE certificate is used to verify only a
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single object at a time. As long as the sequence of objects
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verified by this EE certificate are published using the same file
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name, then this sequential, multiple use of the EE certificate is
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also valid. This form of use of an EE certificate is termed a
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"sequential-use" EE certificate.
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</t>
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</section>
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<section title="Manifest Definition" anchor="sect-4">
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<t>
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A manifest is an RPKI signed object, as specified in <xref
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target="RFC6488"/>. The RPKI signed object template requires
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specification of the following data elements in the context of the
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manifest structure.
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</t>
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<section title="eContentType" anchor="sect-4.1">
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<t>
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The eContentType for a manifest is defined as id-ct-rpkiManifest
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and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26.
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</t>
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<figure>
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<artwork>
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<![CDATA[
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id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
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rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
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id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
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id-ct-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 26 }
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]]>
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</artwork>
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</figure>
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</section>
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<section title="eContent" anchor="sect-4.2">
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<t>
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The content of a manifest is ASN.1 encoded using the
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Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) <xref target="X.690"/>. The
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content of a manifest is defined as follows:
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</t>
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<figure>
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<artwork>
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<![CDATA[
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Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
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version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
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manifestNumber INTEGER (0..MAX),
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thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
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nextUpdate GeneralizedTime,
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fileHashAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
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fileList SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF FileAndHash
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}
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FileAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
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file IA5String,
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hash BIT STRING
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}
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]]>
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</artwork>
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</figure>
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<section title="Manifest" anchor="sect-4.2.1">
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<t>
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The manifestNumber, thisUpdate, and nextUpdate fields are
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modeled after the corresponding fields in X.509 CRLs (see
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<xref target="RFC5280"/>). Analogous to CRLs, a manifest is
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nominally current until the time specified in nextUpdate or
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until a manifest is issued with a greater manifest number,
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whichever comes first.
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</t>
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<t>
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If a "one-time-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
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manifest, the EE certificate MUST have a validity period that
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coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate, to
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prevent needless growth of the CA's CRL.
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</t>
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<t>
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If a "sequential-use" EE certificate is employed to verify a
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manifest, the EE certificate's validity period needs to be no
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shorter than the nextUpdate time of the current manifest.
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The extended validity time raises the possibility of a
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substitution attack using a stale manifest, as described in
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<xref target="sect-6.4"/>.
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</t>
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<t>
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The data elements of the manifest structure are defined as
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follows:
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</t>
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<t>
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<list style="hanging" hangIndent="3">
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<t hangText="version:"> <vspace blankLines="0"/>
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The version number of this version of the manifest
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specification MUST be 0.
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</t>
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<t hangText="manifestNumber:"> <vspace blankLines="0"/>
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This field is an integer that is incremented each time a
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new manifest is issued for a given publication point.
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This field allows an RP to detect gaps in a sequence of
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published manifests.
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<vspace blankLines="1"/>
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As the manifest is modeled on the CRL specification, the
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ManifestNumber is analogous to the CRLNumber, and the
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guidance in <xref target="RFC5280"/> for CRLNumber values
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is appropriate as to the range of number values that can
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be used for the manifestNumber. Manifest numbers can be
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expected to contain long integers. Manifest verifiers
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MUST be able to handle number values up to 20 octets.
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Conforming manifest issuers MUST NOT use number values
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longer than 20 octets.
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</t>
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<t hangText="thisUpdate:"> <vspace blankLines="0"/>
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This field contains the time when the manifest was
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created. This field has the same format constraints as
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specified in <xref target="RFC5280"/> for the CRL field of
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the same name.
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</t>
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<t hangText="nextUpdate:"><vspace blankLines="0"/>
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This field contains the time at which the next scheduled
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manifest will be issued. The value of nextUpdate MUST be
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later than the value of thisUpdate. The specification of
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the GeneralizedTime value is the same as required for the
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thisUpdate field.
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<vspace blankLines="1"/>
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If the authority alters any of the items that it has
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published in the repository publication point, then the
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authority MUST issue a new manifest before the nextUpdate
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time. If a manifest encompasses a CRL, the nextUpdate
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field of the manifest MUST match that of the CRL's
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nextUpdate field, as the manifest will be re-issued when a
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new CRL is published. If a "one-time-use" EE certificate
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is used to verify the manifest, then when a new manifest
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is issued before the time specified in nextUpdate of the
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current manifest, the CA MUST also issue a new CRL that
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includes the EE certificate corresponding to the old
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manifest.
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</t>
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<t hangText="fileHashAlg:"> <vspace blankLines="0"/>
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This field contains the OID of the hash algorithm used to
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hash the files that the authority has placed into the
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repository. The hash algorithm used MUST conform to the
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RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile specification <xref
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target="RFC6485"/>.
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</t>
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<t hangText="fileList:"><vspace blankLines="0"/>
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This field is a sequence of FileAndHash objects. There is
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one FileAndHash entry for each currently valid signed
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object that has been published by the authority (at this
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publication point). Each FileAndHash is an ordered pair
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consisting of the name of the file in the repository
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publication point (directory) that contains the object in
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question and a hash of the file's contents.
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</t>
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</list>
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</t>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section title="Content-Type Attribute" anchor="sect-4.3">
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<t>
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The mandatory content-type attribute MUST have its attrValues
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field set to the same OID as eContentType. This OID is
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id-ct-rpkiManifest and has the numerical value of
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1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26.
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</t>
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</section>
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<section title="Manifest Validation" anchor="sect-4.4">
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<t>
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To determine whether a manifest is valid, the RP MUST perform
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the following checks in addition to those specified in <xref
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target="RFC6488"/>:
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</t>
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<t>
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<list style="numbers">
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<t>
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The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is
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id-ad-rpkiManifest (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26).
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</t>
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<t>
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The version of the rpkiManifest is 0.
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</t>
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<t>
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In the rpkiManifest, thisUpdate precedes nextUpdate.
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</t>
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</list>
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</t>
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<t>
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If the above procedure indicates that the manifest is invalid,
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then the manifest MUST be discarded and treated as though no
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manifest were present.
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</t>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section title="Manifest Generation" anchor="sect-5">
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<section title="Manifest Generation Procedure" anchor="sect-5.1">
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<t>
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For a CA publication point in the RPKI repository system, a CA
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MUST perform the following steps to generate a manifest:
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</t>
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<t>
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<list style="numbers">
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<t>
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If no key pair exists, or if using a "one-time-use" EE
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certificate with a new key pair, generate a key pair.
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</t>
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<t>
|
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If using a "one-time-use" EE certificate, or if a key pair
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was generated in step 1, or if using a "sequential-use" EE
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|
certificate that will expire before the intended nextUpdate
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time of this manifest, issue an EE certificate for this key
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pair.<vspace blankLines="1"/> This EE certificate MUST have
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an SIA extension access description field with an
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accessMethod OID value of id-ad-signedobject, where the
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associated accessLocation references the publication point
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of the manifest as an object URL.
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|
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
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|
This EE certificate MUST describe its Internet Number
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Resources (INRs) using the "inherit" attribute, rather than
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explicit description of a resource set (see <xref
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target="RFC3779"/>).
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<vspace blankLines="1"/>
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|
In the case of a "one-time-use" EE certificate, the validity
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|
times of the EE certificate MUST exactly match the
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thisUpdate and nextUpdate times of the manifest.
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|
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
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|
In the case of a "sequential-use" EE certificate, the
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|
validity times of the EE certificate MUST encompass the time
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interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate.
|
|
</t>
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|
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<t>
|
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The EE certificate MUST NOT be published in the authority's
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repository publication point.
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|
</t>
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|
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<t>
|
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Construct the manifest content.<vspace blankLines="1"/> The
|
|
manifest content is described in <xref
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target="sect-4.2.1"/>. The manifest's fileList includes the
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file name and hash pair for each object issued by this CA
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that has been published at this repository publication point
|
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(directory). The collection of objects to be included in
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the manifest includes all certificates issued by this CA
|
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that are published at the CA's repository publication point,
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the most recent CRL issued by the CA, and all objects
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verified by EE certificates that were issued by this CA that
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are published at this repository publication point.
|
|
<vspace blankLines="1"/>
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Note that the manifest does not include a self reference
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(i.e., its own file name and hash), since it would be
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impossible to compute the hash of the manifest itself prior
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to it being signed.
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</t>
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<t>
|
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Encapsulate the manifest content using the CMS SignedData
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content type (as specified <xref target="sect-4"/>), sign
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the manifest using the private key corresponding to the
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subject key contained in the EE certificate, and publish the
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manifest in the repository system publication point that is
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described by the manifest.
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</t>
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<t>
|
|
In the case of a key pair that is to be used only once, in
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conjunction with a "one-time-use" EE certificate, the
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private key associated with this key pair MUST now be
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destroyed.
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</t>
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|
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</list>
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</t>
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</section>
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|
|
<section title="Considerations for Manifest Generation" anchor="sect-5.2">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
A new manifest MUST be issued and published on or before the
|
|
nextUpdate time.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
An authority MUST issue a new manifest in conjunction with the
|
|
finalization of changes made to objects in the publication
|
|
point. An authority MAY perform a number of object operations
|
|
on a publication repository within the scope of a repository
|
|
change before issuing a single manifest that covers all the
|
|
operations within the scope of this change. Repository
|
|
operators SHOULD implement some form of repository update
|
|
procedure that mitigates, to the extent possible, the risk that
|
|
RPs that are performing retrieval operations on the repository
|
|
are exposed to inconsistent, transient, intermediate states
|
|
during updates to the repository publication point (directory)
|
|
and the associated manifest.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Since the manifest object URL is included in the SIA of issued
|
|
certificates, a new manifest MUST NOT invalidate the manifest
|
|
object URL of previously issued certificates. This implies that
|
|
the manifest's publication name in the repository, in the form
|
|
of an object URL, is unchanged across manifest generation
|
|
cycles.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
When a CA entity is performing a key rollover, the entity MAY
|
|
choose to have two CA instances simultaneously publishing into
|
|
the same repository publication point. In this case, there will
|
|
be one manifest associated with each active CA instance that is
|
|
publishing into the common repository publication point
|
|
(directory).
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Relying Party Processing of Manifests" anchor="sect-6">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Each RP must determine which signed objects it will use for
|
|
validating assertions about INRs and their use (e.g., which ROAs
|
|
to use in the construction of route filters). As noted earlier,
|
|
manifests are designed to allow an RP to detect manipulation of
|
|
repository data, errors by a CA or repository manager, and/or
|
|
active attacks on the communication channel between an RP and a
|
|
repository. Unless all of the files enumerated in a manifest can
|
|
be obtained by an RP during a fetch operation, the fetch is
|
|
considered to have failed and the RP MUST retry the fetch later.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
<xref target="RFC6480"/> suggests (but does not mandate) that the
|
|
RPKI model employ fetches that are incremental, e.g., an RP
|
|
transfers files from a publication point only if they are
|
|
new/changed since the previous, successful, fetch represented in
|
|
the RP's local cache. This document avoids language that relies on
|
|
details of the underlying file transfer mechanism employed by an
|
|
RP and a publication point to effect this operation. Thus the term
|
|
"fetch" refers to an operation that attempts to acquire the full
|
|
set of files at a publication point, consistent with the
|
|
id-ad-rpkiManifest URI extracted from a CA certificate's SIA (see
|
|
below).
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
If a fetch fails, it is assumed that a subsequent fetch will
|
|
resolve problems encountered during the fetch. Until such time as
|
|
a successful fetch is executed, an RP SHOULD use cached data from
|
|
a previous, successful fetch. This response is intended to prevent
|
|
an RP from misinterpreting data associated with a publication
|
|
point, and thus possibly treating invalid routes as valid, or vice
|
|
versa.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The processing described below is designed to cause all RPs with
|
|
access to the same local cache and RPKI repository data to achieve
|
|
the same results with regard to validation of RPKI data. However,
|
|
in operation, different RPs will access repositories at different
|
|
times, and some RPs may experience local cache failures, so there
|
|
is no guarantee that all RPs will achieve the same results with
|
|
regard to validation of RPKI data.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Note that there is a "chicken and egg" relationship between the
|
|
manifest and the CRL for a given CA instance. If the EE
|
|
certificate for the current manifest is revoked, i.e., it appears
|
|
in the current CRL, then the CA or publication point manager has
|
|
made a serious error. In this case the fetch has failed; proceed
|
|
to <xref target="sect-6.7"/>. Similarly, if the CRL is not listed
|
|
on a valid, current manifest, acquired during a fetch, the fetch
|
|
has failed; proceed to <xref target="sect-6.7"/>, because the CRL
|
|
is considered missing.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Note that if a CA and its associated publication point are
|
|
operating properly, there will always be exactly one manifest and
|
|
one associated CRL at the publication point identified in the CA's
|
|
SIA (see below).
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Manifest Processing Overview" anchor="sect-6.1">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
For a given publication point, an RP MUST perform a series of
|
|
tests to determine which signed object files at the publication
|
|
point are acceptable. The tests described below (<xref
|
|
target="sect-6.2"/> to <xref target="sect-6.6"/>) are to
|
|
be performed using the manifest identified by the
|
|
id-ad-rpkiManifest URI extracted from a CA certificate's
|
|
SIA. All of the files referenced by the manifest MUST be be
|
|
located at the publication point specified by the
|
|
id-ad-caRepository URI from the (same) CA certificate's SIA. The
|
|
manifest and the files it references MUST reside at the same
|
|
publication point. If an RP encounters any files that appear on
|
|
a manifest but do not reside at the same publication point as
|
|
the manifest the RP MUST treat the fetch as failed, and a
|
|
warning MUST be issued (see <xref target="sect-6.7"/> below).
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
A manifest SHOULD contain exactly one CRL (.crl) file and it
|
|
MUST be at the location specified in the CRLDP in the manifest's
|
|
EE certificate. If more than one .crl file appears in the
|
|
manifest, the fetch has failed and the RP MUST proceed to <xref
|
|
target="sect-6.7"/>; otherwise proceed to <xref
|
|
target="sect-6.2"/>.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Note that, during CA key rollover <xref target="RFC6489"/>,
|
|
signed objects for two or more different CA instances will
|
|
appear at the same publication point. Manifest processing is to
|
|
be performed separately for each CA instance, guided by the SIA
|
|
id-ad-rpkiManifest URI in each CA certificate.
|
|
</t>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Acquiring a Manifest for a CA" anchor="sect-6.2">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The RP MUST fetch the manifest identified by the SIA
|
|
id-ad-rpkiManifest URI in the CA certificate. If an RP cannot
|
|
retrieve a manifest using this URI, or if the manifest is not
|
|
valid (<xref target="sect-4.4"/>), an RP MUST treat this as a
|
|
failed fetch and, proceed to <xref target="sect-6.7"/>;
|
|
otherwise proceed to <xref target="sect-6.3"/>.
|
|
</t>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Detecting Stale and or Prematurely-issued Manifests" anchor="sect-6.3">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The RP MUST check that the current time (translated to UTC) is
|
|
between thisUpdate and nextUpdate. If the current time lies
|
|
within this interval, proceed to <xref target="sect-6.4"/>. If
|
|
the current time is earlier than thisUpdate, the CA has made an
|
|
error; this is a failed fetch and the RP MUST proceed to <xref
|
|
target="sect-6.7"/>. If the current time is later than
|
|
nextUpdate, then the manifest is stale; this is a failed fetch
|
|
and RP MUST proceed to <xref target="sect-6.7"/>; otherwise
|
|
proceed to <xref target="sect-6.4"/>.
|
|
</t>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Acquiring Files Referenced by a Manifest" anchor="sect-6.4">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The RP MUST acquire all of the files enumerated in the manifest
|
|
(fileList) from the publication point. This includes the CRL,
|
|
each object containing an EE certificate issued by the CA, and
|
|
any subordinate CA and EE certificates. If there are files
|
|
listed in the manifest that cannot be retrieved from the
|
|
publication point, or if they fail the validity tests specified
|
|
in <xref target="RFC6488"/>, the fetch has failed and the RP
|
|
MUST proceed to <xref target="sect-6.7"/>; otherwise, proceed to
|
|
<xref target="sect-6.5"/>.
|
|
</t>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Matching File Names and Hashes" anchor="sect-6.5">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The RP MUST verify that the hash value of each file listed in
|
|
the manifest matches the value obtained by hashing the file
|
|
acquired from the publication point. If the computed hash value
|
|
of a file listed on the manifest does not match the hash value
|
|
contained in the manifest, then the fetch has failed and the RP
|
|
MUST proceed to <xref target="sect-6.7"/>; otherwise proceed to
|
|
<xref target="sect-6.6"/>.
|
|
</t>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Out of Scope Manifest Entries" anchor="sect-6.6">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
If a current manifest contains entries for objects that are not
|
|
within the scope of the manifest (<xref target="sect-6.2"/>),
|
|
the fetch has failed and the RP SHOULD proceed to <xref
|
|
target="sect-6.7"/>; otherwise the fetch is deemed successful
|
|
and the RP will process the fetched objects.
|
|
</t>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Failed Fetches" anchor="sect-6.7">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
If an RP does not acquire a current valid manifest, or does not
|
|
acquire current valid instances of all of the objects enumerated
|
|
in a current valid manifest as a result of a fetch, then
|
|
processing of the signed objects associated with the CA instance
|
|
has failed for this fetch cycle. The RP MUST issue a warning
|
|
indicating the reason(s) for termination of processing with
|
|
regard to this CA instance. It is RECOMMENDED that a human
|
|
operator be notified of this warning.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Termination of processing means that the RP SHOULD continue to
|
|
use cached versions of the objects associated with this CA
|
|
instance, until such time as they become stale or they can be
|
|
replaced by objects from a successful fetch. This implies that
|
|
the RP MUST not try to acquire and validate subordinate signed
|
|
objects, e.g., subordinate CA certificates, until the next
|
|
interval when the RP is scheduled to fetch and process data for
|
|
this CA instance.
|
|
</t>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Publication Repositories" anchor="sect-7">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The RPKI publication system model requires that every publication
|
|
point be associated with one or more CAs, and be non-empty. Upon
|
|
creation of the publication point associated with a CA, the CA
|
|
MUST create and publish a manifest as well as a CRL. A CA's
|
|
manifest will always contain at least one entry, namely, the CRL
|
|
issued by the CA upon repository creation <xref
|
|
target="RFC6481"/>.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Every published signed object in the RPKI <xref target="RFC6488"/>
|
|
is published in the repository publication point of the CA that
|
|
issued the EE certificate, and is listed in the manifest
|
|
associated with that CA certificate.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Security Considerations" anchor="sect-8">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Manifests provide an additional level of protection for RPKI RPs.
|
|
Manifests can assist an RP to determine if a repository object has
|
|
been deleted, occluded, or otherwise removed from view, or if a
|
|
publication of a newer version of an object has been suppressed
|
|
(and an older version of the object has been substituted).
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
Manifests cannot repair the effects of such forms of corruption of
|
|
repository retrieval operations. However, a manifest enables an
|
|
RP to determine if a locally maintained copy of a repository is a
|
|
complete and up-to-date copy, even when the repository retrieval
|
|
operation is conducted over an insecure channel. In cases where
|
|
the manifest and the retrieved repository contents differ, the
|
|
manifest can assist in determining which repository objects form
|
|
the difference set in terms of missing, extraneous, or superseded
|
|
objects.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The signing structure of a manifest and the use of the nextUpdate
|
|
value allows an RP to determine if the manifest itself is the
|
|
subject of attempted alteration. The requirement for every
|
|
repository publication point to contain at least one manifest
|
|
allows an RP to determine if the manifest itself has been occluded
|
|
from view. Such attacks against the manifest are detectable
|
|
within the time frame of the regular schedule of manifest updates.
|
|
Forms of replay attack within finer-grained time frames are not
|
|
necessarily detectable by the manifest structure.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="IANA Considerations" anchor="sect-9">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
As <xref target="RFC6488"/> created and populated the registries
|
|
"RPKI Signed Object" and three-letter filename extensions for
|
|
"RPKI Repository Name Schemes," no new action is requested of the
|
|
IANA.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<!--
|
|
<t>
|
|
This document registers the following in the "RPKI Signed Object"
|
|
registry created by <xref target="RFC6488"/>:
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<figure>
|
|
<artwork>
|
|
<![CDATA[
|
|
Name: Manifest
|
|
OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26
|
|
Reference: [TBD] (this document)
|
|
]]>
|
|
</artwork>
|
|
</figure>
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
This document registers the following three-letter filename
|
|
extension for "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by
|
|
<xref target="RFC6481"/>:
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
<figure>
|
|
<artwork>
|
|
<![CDATA[
|
|
Filename extension: mft
|
|
RPKI Object: Manifest
|
|
Reference: [RFC6481]
|
|
]]>
|
|
</artwork>
|
|
</figure>
|
|
-->
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
<section title="Acknowledgements" anchor="sect-10">
|
|
|
|
<t>
|
|
The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from
|
|
George Michelson and Randy Bush in the preparation of the manifest
|
|
specification. Additionally, the authors would like to thank Mark
|
|
Reynolds and Christopher Small for assistance in clarifying
|
|
manifest validation and RP behavior. The authors also wish to
|
|
thank Job Snijders, Oleg Muravskiy, and Sean Turner for their
|
|
helpful review of this document.
|
|
</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
</middle>
|
|
|
|
<back>
|
|
|
|
<references title="Normative References">
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.5280"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6481"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6485"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6487"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6488"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.8174"?>
|
|
<reference anchor="X.690">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of basic encoding Rules (BER), Canonical encoding rules (CER) and Distinguished encoding rules (DER)</title>
|
|
<author>
|
|
<organization>International International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee</organization>
|
|
</author>
|
|
<date month="July" year="2002" />
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name="CCITT" value="Recommendation X.690" />
|
|
</reference>
|
|
<!--
|
|
<reference>
|
|
[X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
|
|
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
|
|
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
|
|
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
|
|
(DER).
|
|
-->
|
|
</references>
|
|
|
|
<references title="Informative References">
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3370"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3779"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6480"?>
|
|
<?rfc include="reference.RFC.6489"?>
|
|
</references>
|
|
|
|
<section title="ASN.1 Module" anchor="sect-a">
|
|
|
|
<figure>
|
|
<artwork>
|
|
<![CDATA[
|
|
RPKIManifest { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
|
|
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) 60 }
|
|
|
|
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
|
|
|
|
BEGIN
|
|
|
|
-- EXPORTS ALL --
|
|
|
|
-- IMPORTS NOTHING --
|
|
|
|
-- Manifest Content Type: OID
|
|
|
|
id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
|
|
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }
|
|
|
|
id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }
|
|
|
|
id-ct-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 26 }
|
|
|
|
-- Manifest Content Type: eContent
|
|
|
|
Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
|
|
manifestNumber INTEGER (0..MAX),
|
|
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
|
|
nextUpdate GeneralizedTime,
|
|
fileHashAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
|
|
fileList SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF FileAndHash
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
FileAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
|
|
file IA5String,
|
|
hash BIT STRING
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
END
|
|
]]>
|
|
</artwork>
|
|
</figure>
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
</back>
|
|
|
|
</rfc>
|